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Abstract: In this article, I start from the premises that claims to
inventive information qua information are not and should not be
patentable, and I pursue two lines of inquiry.
First, I argue that a structural theory of Section lOl of the Patent
Act provides a policy-driven, conceptually coherent and statutorily
justified interpretation that explains why claims to inventive
information qua information should be excluded from the realm of
patentable subject matter. In brief, patentable subject matter must be
restricted in this manner to preserve the duality of claiming and
disclosing upon which the entire patent regime is constructed.
Second, I raise the line-drawing problem that I believe to be the
most significant obstacle to an administrable implementation of a
structural theory of Section lol. The breadth or polyvalency of the
concept of information suggests that many things that we currently
treat as patentable, if not all of them, are also information. We must
develop a more refined taxonomy of the different types of
informationality that material things possess in order to sort the
patentable claims to information from the unpatentable ones.
Because the immateriality of the things described by a claim is not an
acceptable proxy for their informationality, the Federal Circuit's
recent opinion in In re Nuijten that addresses intangibility as a
restriction on patentable subject matter is not a useful starting point
for this project.
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. This article
is a refinement of a presentation that I gave at The Future of Patent Reform conference at
The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. I thank Mark Lemley, Michael Risch and
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I. INTRODUCTION
Inventive information qua information should not be patentable.
Patents should allow inventors to control some "things" that embody
inventive information, but not the inventive information itself., A
simple example illustrates that these assertions are uncontroversial,
bedrock principles of contemporary patent protection. Assume that
an inventor discovers, isolates and purifies Protein X. She may be
able to claim "Protein X in its purified and isolated form" as an
embodiment of the inventive information,2 but she clearly cannot
claim "a representation of the structure of Protein X recorded on a
tangible medium." The information that demonstrates why a claimed
invention is inventive is a public domain resource that is and should
be "exacted from" the patentee and given to the public without
restriction as a condition of the patentee's right to exclude from the
patentable embodiments of an invention.3
My goal in this article is not to defend at length the normative
assertion that blatant claims to inventive information qua information
like the above claim to a tangible representation are not and should
not be patentable.4 As it applies to the most blatant of claims to
information qua information, this assertion is uncontroversial, both
descriptively and normatively. Even commentators who defend an
expansionist view of patent protection assume that inventive
information itself escapes the net of property cast by patent law.5
11 use the term "things" (and other related terms such as "inventions") loosely and
recursively. It is loose in that both objects and processes are things that can infringe
patents. It is recursive in that it refers both to thing-tokens (instances of things in the
extensional world that infringe patents) and thing-types (the conceptual categories to
which the thing-tokens belong). Cf. Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects,
Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 381, 382-83 (2005) (exploring the
relationship between law and things).
2 But cf. infra note 16 (noting that "products of nature" are not patentable subject matter if
they are merely discovered by the patent applicant).
3 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) ("[Ilmmediate disclosure is not the objective
of, but is exactedfrom, the patentee. It is the price paid for the exclusivity secured.")
(citing J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001)).
4 But see infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (offering a summary justification for
such a rule).
5 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1010 (2003) (suggesting "that even fully
'propertized' intellectual goods will nonetheless contribute, perhaps significantly, to the
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Furthermore, the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal
Circuit") would find a reason to deny or invalidate respectively blatant
claims to information qua information, although the exact reasoning
that they would employ is unclear. Rather, starting from the premises
that blatant claims to information qua information are not and should
not be patentable, I pursue two subsidiary goals.
First, I articulate the bare bones of a structural theory of Section
lOl of the Patent Act to explain why the logic and statutory text of the
patent laws dictate that inventive information qua information should
be unpatentable subject matter.6 To invalidate claims to information
qua information under Section lOl, courts must go beyond the plain
meaning of the section's literal text viewed in isolation to understand
the meaning of the statute. Section 1ol must be interpreted in light of
the structure of the Patent Act as a whole and, more specifically, in
light of the "duality of claiming and disclosing" on which the entire
patent regime is premised.7 Courts should use Section lOl to enforce
the disclosure obligation of the inventor and patentee-the obligation
to place inventive information qua information in the public domain
without any strings attached-and thus to protect the disclosure side
of the duality from inefficient encroachment by the claiming side.
Second, I raise (but do not resolve) a line-drawing problem for a
structural theory that follows from the breadth of the contemporary
notion of information. The problem is not whether there is such a
thing as inventive information qua information that is and should
remain unpatentable subject matter under Section lOl. Clearly, there
is. Rather, the problem is whether a policy-driven and administrable
limiting principle can be found to make the process of identifying
claims to information qua information anything other than the
uncertain and evolving "I know it when I see it" test that it has been
up to this point.8 The distinction between a claim to a patentable
embodiment and a claim to unpatentable information qua
growth of open information" because intellectual property just does not propertize
information itself).
6 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2007).
7 Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Patenting Science: Protecting the
Domain ofAccessible Knowledge, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING
THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 192, 193 n.4 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz
eds., 2006).
8 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing the
identification of pornography that is unprotected by the First Amendment).
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information is an intuitive one in many easy cases. At first glance, we
do know the difference between a claim to "isolated and purified
Protein X" and "a tangible representation of the structure of Protein
X" when we see it. However, there will also be many difficult cases
that lie in a gray, murky area where different intuitions lead in
different directions. Upon closer examination, many routinely
patentable embodiments of inventions such as computer software and
DNA are reasonably described as nothing more than information
recorded on a tangible medium.
The murkiness is attributable in part to the fact that the
immateriality of a claimed invention is not an effective proxy for its
informationality. (Thus, the Federal Circuit's recent opinion in In re
Nuijten9 holding that claims to relatively immaterial, information-
bearing signals do not recite patentable subject matter should not
distract us from the goal of shielding information qua information
from patentability.) To identify unpatentable claims to inventive
information qua information and to distinguish them from
information-intensive claims that do recite patentable subject matter,
a structural theory of Section lO requires a yet-to-be-developed
taxonomy of the different kinds of informationality that tangible
resources can possess.
This article proceeds in three steps. Section II offers a status
report on the confused state of the contemporary patentable subject
matter doctrine. Section III outlines my proposal for a structural
theory of Section 1ol that, if adopted, would provide a policy-driven,
conceptually coherent and statutorily justified basis for invalidating
claims to inventive information qua information. Section IV explores
the difficulty of distinguishing patentable information from
unpatentable information.
II. A STATUS REPORT ON SECTION 101
Section lOl of the Patent Act authorizes the courts and the PTO to
act as gate-keepers for the realm of patentable things. The basic
thrust of this patentable subject matter doctrine is that there are some
types of progress that just should not be propertized by patents,
regardless of how inventive, well-described, and useful they are to
society.
The practical importance of Section lOl diminished during the
198os and 199os. It is a familiar story that during this time period the
In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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propertizing reach of the patent regime grew as more and more of
what was once presumed to be unpatentable (e.g. software and
business methods) became dejure patentable and defacto patented.10
This erosion can be described with any of three different stories. A
doctrinal recounting of the erosion focuses on, first, the establishment
of a default in favor of patentability in Diamond v. Chakrabarty
outside of an enumerated set of classes of discoveries that are
excluded from patentability,11 and, second, the gradual, post-
Chakrabarty erosion of both the number and scope of those excluded
classes. A policy-oriented description of the same events casts Section
lOl doctrine as a doctrine that is both economically unjustifiable and
costly to administer.12 A more nuanced variant casts Section l1 as
the vestigial appendix of patent doctrine. Perhaps it served a useful
function in the past, but today it is no longer necessary because any
claim that is unpatentable under the patentable subject matter
doctrine is also invalid under one of the now-refined invalidity
doctrines.13 Finally, a plain-meaning textualist telling the same story
might merely note that there is little to no statutory support for the
exclusions as Section 101 merely states that "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" is a
patentable invention.14 Importantly, these three stories are mutually
10 Growth in the number of privatizable things is not a phenomenon specific to patents
among intellectual property regimes. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement
and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37-40 (2003)
(arguing that "[w]e are in the middle of a second enclosure movement").
11 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (198o) (holding that "anything under the
sun that is made by man" can fall within the scope of Section l1 but that "laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas" do not).
12 See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REv. 55, 1O8 (2003).
13 See Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable (on file with author). Cf. Kristen Osenga,
Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1O87 (arguing that
the statutory subject matter requirement has no special role to play in determining the
validity of claims to computer software).
14 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2007). A textual argument supporting limits on statutory subject matter
can also be made based on the Constitution, which grants Congress the authority to
promote progress in the "useful Arts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It is therefore possible
to argue that patentable subject matter encompasses something like the "technological
arts" but not the "liberal arts." Compare In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A.
1970) (creating a soon-to-be-rejected "technological arts" test); with Exparte Lundgren,
No. 2003-2o88, 2005 Pat. App. LEXIS 34, at *5-12 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 28, 2005) (rejecting a
"technological arts" test). See also John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal
2oo8]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
reinforcing, not conflicting. The set of expressly excluded classes has
proven difficult to maintain as a bulwark against the default of
patentability precisely because there is no textual justification for the
exceptions within the four corners of the text of Section l1, and the
list of the set's members reads like an ad hoc collection of ill-defined
"no-no's" that lack convincing, policy-driven narratives of
justification.
The classes of inventions that are now understood to be excluded
from patentable subject matter are most easily described in two
groups: those that have been identified and sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court and those that have only been addressed by the
lower courts or the PTO.
The Supreme Court has identified a trio of excluded classes: "laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."5 However, the
nature of the inventions that fall within these three excluded classes-
and whether they are even three separate classes-is difficult to grasp.
Most importantly for the discussion here,16 the Court has clearly
stated that mathematical algorithms are "laws of nature" that cannot
be patented in the abstract but that can be patented when applied in
methods that are, when "considered as a whole," performing "a
function that the patent laws were designed to protect."17 Precisely
why mathematical algorithms are unpatentable when described in the
abstract, however, is not clear. One justification is that mathematical
algorithms, along with other "laws of nature," are "the basic tools of
scientific and technological work."18 The standard and reductive
Professions, 4o B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999) (arguing that patentable subject matter has
exceeded the bounds of the technological arts).
'5 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. Although this list is often taken as definitive, the
Supreme Court has recited other excluded categories in other opinions.
16 Because this article focuses on the status of information under Section il, there are two
significant branches of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on Section lOl that are not
discussed. First, products of nature such as plants or minerals that are pre-existing,
natural entities and that are merely discovered and brought to society's attention by a
patent applicant are not patentable subject matter. See, e.g., In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031,
1036 (C.C.P.A 1977). Second, the 1853 Supreme Court case of O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62
(1853), suggests that the patentable subject matter doctrine is also involved in the policing
of claim overbreadth, a task that is more commonly performed today under the auspices of
the enablement and written description doctrines.
17 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (ig8i).
i8 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). Another justification for this rule suggests
that man-made and, therefore, patentable "inventions" must be juxtaposed with
unpatentable "discoveries" wherein the human contribution to technological progress is
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utilitarian justification for patents identifies one benefit (the incentive
to invent generated by the lure of property) and one cost (the static
cost of reduced consumption of the material embodiments of progress
due to the higher cost of patented goods).19
The "basic tools" argument adds one additional cost into the
equation: the property in inventions granted to generation N
inventors can impose dynamic costs by slowing down or hindering the
work of the inventors in generation N+i. 20 When the dynamic costs of
patents are taken into account, the justification for patents on "basic
tools"-the things that are most commonly used as inputs into
ongoing invention by innovative consumers-is weaker than the
justification for patents on the types of things most commonly used by
passive consumers. However, neither the Supreme Court nor the
Federal Circuit has generalized from this "basic tools" rationale to
expand the categories of unpatentable subject matter. They have not
identified any other categories of things beyond mathematical
algorithms that are "laws of nature" in the abstract.21
akin to merely dusting off what already existed in nature. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584, 593 n.i (1978). Cf. supra note 16 (discussing the invention/discovery distinction in
the context of claims to naturally occurring substances). The distinction between
inventions and discoveries, however, is in many instances a metaphysical line that is
neither easy to draw nor compelling as a proxy for utilitarian concerns.
19 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1966) (discussing Thomas
Jefferson's view of the patent system).
20 In theory, there are a variety of distinct types of dynamic costs. See, e.g., Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/
cgi/reprint/28o/5364/698.pdf (discussing several distinct factors that contribute to the
transaction cost problem that may arise when an inventor of generation N+i must bundle
the rights of the inventors of generation N); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 1048-67 (1996) (detailing
the strategic bargaining that may occur between an inventor N and an inventor N+I with
blocking patents); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 885-88 (1990) (arguing that broad, early patents
stifled technological progress in the electrical lighting industry because of a lack of
competition for follow-on inventions).
21 The Section lOl "laws of nature" doctrine requires the identification of additional classes
or categories of "basic tools" that can be circumscribed ex ante and that are likely to
impose uncommonly high dynamic costs when patented. Because the costs will vary over
time, case by case analysis of the dynamic costs imposed on future innovation by a
particular claim is, if appropriate at all, more in keeping with the spirit of the experimental
use exemption than it is with the subject matter patentability doctrine.
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The lower courts defend additional exclusions, often without
offering any policy justification at all. During the 195os and 196os,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected claims under a
branch of Section lOl called the "mental steps" doctrine, although the
contemporary vitality of this doctrine is questionable.22 The Federal
Circuit still rejects claims to "printed matter" as unpatentable,23 but
the scope of this exclusion is uncertain due to its entanglement with
the historical business method exception from patentable subject
matter which has been expressly rejected by the Federal Circuit.24
Extending the printed matter doctrine into the digital age, the PTO
has declared its intention to make a distinction between "functional"
and "nonfunctional descriptive material" when patent claims describe
data stored in digital, computer-readable form.
The PTO allows "functional" software claims to issue but reasons
that "nonfunctional" claims, such as those to musical compositions
and raw data, are unpatentable under Section l1.25 Although the
exclusion of the informational content of songs, books and databases
may intuitively seem to produce the "correct" result, the logical
reasoning that the PTO uses to distinguish functional from
nonfunctional descriptive material is opaque at best. The distinction
between "functional" and "nonfunctional" seems to be an entirely
pragmatic response to the goal-driven policy of allowing many claims
on software but denying the most blatant of claims to inventive
information qua information.
Within the last several years, there has been a resurgence in
Section l1 cases. The PTO, the Federal Circuit, and even the
Supreme Court have all grappled with arguments suggesting that
immateriality is in some way a meaningful limit on patentable subject
22 Compare In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (embracing the
mental steps doctrine), with In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 888-89 (rejecting the mental
steps doctrine). See also Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 6o SMU L. REV.
317, 355-57 (2007) (summarizing the history and current status of the mental steps
doctrine).
23 See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1337-39 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (invalidating a claim as
anticipated under Section 102 when the only difference between the claimed invention and
the prior art resided in the printed matter).
24 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that there is no business method exception to patentable subject
matter).
25 See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106.01, at 210o-18 (8th ed. rev.
2oo6).
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matter.26 Even if software is patentable when in a moderately tangible
state, such as when it is stored on disks or running on programmed
machines, perhaps inventions that are yet less tangible-signals when
detached from a storage medium (In re Nuijten),27 business methods
neither executed through software nor requiring a tangible object to
implement (In re Comiskey),28 and/or mental rather than computer
execution of information-processing tasks (Laboratory Corp. v.
Metabolite Labs.)29-should not be patentable.
III. A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF SECTION 101
Blatant claims to information qua information suggest that the
subject matter patentability doctrine of Section 101 is not a useless,
path-dependent appendix of contemporary patent law.30 Placing the
doctrine of subject matter patentability aside, a blatant claim to
information qua information, such as a claim to "a representation of
the structure of Protein X recorded on a tangible medium or carried
on a signal," arguably satisfies all of the criteria of patent validity
under their current judicial interpretations.31
26 A focus on immateriality is not new to Section lO argumentation. Immateriality has
long played a prominent yet uncertain role in the subject matter patentability doctrine. See
Collins, supra note 22, at 346-47 (briefly reviewing the role that intangibility has played in
Section lO doctrine). The immateriality issues currently before the PTO and the courts
merely push an old concern into new arenas and deal with a relative degree of
immateriality that has never previously been addressed.
27 In re Nuliten, 500 F.3d at 1353-57 (holding that a claim to a "signal" is not patentable
subject matter but not reviewing the PTO's decision to grant a claim to the same
information when recorded on a "storage medium").
28 In re Comiskey, 449 F.3d 1378 ("[T]he patent statute does not allow patents on
particular systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone."). See also
Exparte Lundgren, No. 2003-2o88, 2005 Pat. App. LEXIS 34, at *134-43 (B.P.A.I. Sept.
28, 2005) (Barrett, A.P.J., dissenting) (arguing that the mental steps doctrine should play
an active role in determining patentability); Exparte Bilski, Appeal No. 2002-2257,
Application o8/933/892, at *11 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 20o6) (Informative Opinion)
(incorporating the dissent in Exparte Lundgren into the analysis of the majority opinion).
29 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2oo6) (dismissing
certiorari as improvidently granted in a case that turned on the patentability of mental
reasoning). See also Collins, supra note 22, at 323-42 (framing Lab. Corp. as a case about
the propertization of thought).
30 Cf. supra note 13 and accompanying text.
31 The exercise of examining what a court without recourse to the subject matter
patentability doctrine would do if faced with a blatant claim to information qua
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Assuming that the structure of Protein X is unknown before the
inventor's work, the representation should logically be novel.32 To use
a pen-and-ink representation as an example, prior to the inventor's
work, no sheet of paper existed with marks on it that conveyed the
structure of Protein X. In other words, it is not only the semantic
content of the writing or representation (i.e., the signified) that is
novel. The physical structure of the signs used to convey that content
(i.e., the signifier) is also novel.33
Assuming that the representation operates within a conventional
technique or language, nonobviousness presents a more difficult
information may resemble tilting at windmills. Because I believe that courts would view
such a claim as something that clearly should not be patented, I also believe they would
sculpt an exception from some doctrine-any doctrine available-to deny its patentability.
My point in the following paragraphs is only that a blatant claim to information qua
information should present an easy case of something that cannot be patented, but why it
is an easy case is not self-evident until a structural theory is brought to bear on the issue.
Claims to inventive information qua information should clearly be different from routinely
patentable subject matter, and patent doctrine has yet to develop a robust explanation for
why and how they are different.
It is relatively easy to imagine an implementation of a structural theory (i.e. a theory that
looks to the structural duality of claiming and disclosing of the Patent Act as a whole in
order to interpret individual statutes) that prevents claims to inventive information qua
information from issuing in the novelty, nonobviousness and/or utility doctrines. See
infra notes 33, 35 and 37. If exceptions to the rules of novelty, nonobviousness and/or
utility are made so as to achieve the goal of a structural theory, I will not quibble at length
with the doctrinal silo within which the structural theory is housed. However, there are
two reasons why Section l1 may provide the better locus for a structural theory. First,
there is a truth-in-advertising value in housing the structural theory in Section 101. The
structural theory sounds in the rhetoric of Section 1l: one particular type of progress,
namely progress in the production of inventive information itself, is simply not the kind of
progress that we should propertize. Second, at least with respect to a structural theory of
either Section 102 or 103, the theory must extend beyond traditional printed matter. The
normative and doctrinal reasoning behind the structural theory applies with equal force to
both printed and computer-readable information qua information, and I believe that the
structural theory may prove very difficult to apply to computer software through
manipulation of the novelty and nonobviousness doctrines. Cf. supra note 25 and
accompanying text (discussing the "nonfunctional descriptive material" exception to the
patentability of software under Section lOl).
32 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2007) (codifying the core of the novelty requirement).
33 In In re Ngai, the Federal Circuit implicitly held that the novelty of the representation's
signifiers in their specific arrangement is irrelevant in a Section 102 analysis and expressly
held that the representation's semantic content is also irrelevant. 367 F.3d at 1338. This
approach can be described as a structural theory of novelty-an approach that modifies the
ordinary rules of the novelty inquiry in order to effectuate the policy goal of invalidating
claims to inventive information qua information.
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issue.34 How nonobviousness could be determined without reference
to the semantic content of the representation is not easy to formulate.
An inquiry into whether a person having ordinary skill in the art is
motivated to make a particular set of signifiers is meaningless without
reference to what the signified means because we make such signs
only to communicate semantic content. Furthermore, the
nonobviousness inquiry must consider the mental state of the person
having ordinary skill in the art (the "PHOSITA"), even in the most
traditional of technologies: a widget is nonobvious if and only if the
PHOSITA did not conceive of it or have motivation to produce it.
Provided that the semantic content of the representation can be
considered in a nonobviousness analysis, the claimed representation
should logically be nonobvious whenever the structure of Protein X is
unknown before the inventor's work.35
The claimed invention is also arguably useful under the
contemporary utility doctrine.36 The use of the representation as a
tool to communicate known, specific, and valuable information
differentiates it from the chemical intermediates that the courts have
found to lack statutory utility.37
Finally, the disclosure doctrines do not, on their face, prevent the
patenting of blatant claims to inventive information qua information.
If the disclosure teaches the structure of Protein X and/or how to
34 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2007) (codifying the nonobviousness requirement).
35 The Federal Circuit has held that the meanings of representations on conventional
printed matter cannot in and of themselves demonstrate the statutory nonobviousness of a
claim to a representation. In re Gulak, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Where the
printed matter is not functionally related to the substrate, the printed matter will not
distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability."). This interpretation
of the nonobviousness requirements produces a structural theory of Section 103 for
conventional printed matter.
36 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2007) (codifying the utility requirement); Brenner v. Manson, 383
U.S. 519 (1966) (holding that chemicals lack statutory utility if their only known use is as
an input into further experiments); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(extending Brenner v. Manson to ESTs).
37 It is, of course, possible that the courts may incorporate the concerns that underlie the
structural theory into the utility doctrine and conclude that claims to information qua
information lack statutory utility simply because they represent inventive information. Cf
In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1365-67 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(interpreting the utility doctrine so as to encompass concerns about the patentability of
information that previously had been considered under the patentable subject matter
doctrine).
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assay for it, the claim is enabled and sufficiently described.38 The
claim is also definite: it describes a bounded and identifiable group of
representations so long as one of ordinary skill in the art can
distinguish writings that represent Protein X from writings that do
not.39
Thus, if the patent regime is to be kept clear of the most self-
evident of claims to information qua information, it would seem that
the brunt of the work falls most logically to Section lOl and the
doctrine of subject matter patentability. This outcome is not jarring to
anyone who believes that subject matter patentability has any legs left
at all. The bailiwick of patentable subject matter easily assimilates the
job of policing against the privatization of inventive information.
Many of its current, independent doctrines are clustered around the
goal of ensuring that information about inventions remains in the
public domain, even if no single doctrine alone accomplishes or
expressly articulates that goal as a policy concern. 40
A structural theory of Section ol, however, does more than
merely add a bar on claims to information qua information to the list
of ad hoc prohibitions that currently populate the subject matter
patentability doctrine. A structural theory of Section lOl provides
what many Section lOl doctrines lack: narrative and policy coherence
38 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2007) (codifying the enablement and written description
requirements). The problem with claims to inventive information qua information is not
that they are too general, abstract, or broad. Consider, for example, a modified version of
the claim to a representation of Protein X that only described representations made
following a specific, highly circumscribed convention for showing molecular structure.
Such a claim would be narrow and specific, yet it would still be a claim to inventive
information qua information.
39 See id. para. 2 (codifying the claim definiteness requirement). Again, the claim could be
modified to encompass only representations of Protein X using a specific convention for
illustrating molecular structure and any definiteness problem would be entirely defused.
40 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (presenting the mental steps, printed
matter, and nonfunctional descriptive material doctrines). The Supreme Court's repeated
pronouncement that "abstract ideas" and the like are unpatentable seems like a good place
to look for a prohibition on claims to inventive information qua information. See, e.g.,
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874) ("An idea of itself is not
patentable."); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) ("A principle, in the abstract, is a
fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented .... ). However,
the Supreme Court's holding often cited for this rule suggests that the prohibition on
abstract ideas only serves as a back-up to the disclosure doctrines by imposing a limit on
the permissible generality of claim language; see supra note 16 (discussing O'Reilly), and
the problem with claims to information qua information is not that their language is too
general. See supra note 38.
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that serves as a breakwater to prevent the further erosion of the
doctrine of subject matter patentability.
When patent law is described as being premised on a "duality of
claiming and disclosing,"41 what is meant is that patent law generates
two distinct entitlements and vests each one in a different party.
Claims create one entitlement: a limited right of exclusion that is
vested, at least initially, in the inventor.42 Disclosures create another:
they generate privileges of access and use,43 and they vest them in the
public.44 These qualities alone, however, do not explain the duality of
patent law. Many property regimes that are not described as dualistic
grant rights to exclude that are limited by public privileges of access.
For example, ownership of land confers upon the owner the right to
exclude all others except in the instance of necessity, in which the law
41 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 193 n.4.
42 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2007) (listing the exclusive rights of a patentee).
43 The term "privileges" is used here in a Hohfeldian, not a procedural, sense. See Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-44 (1913) (classifying "rights" and "privileges" as "jural
opposites").
44 The Patent Act states that patent applicants must provide "a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains...
to make and use the same .... 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2007). Other statutory provisions
require the PTO to publish the patent disclosure and make it available to the public. See id.
§ 122(b) (requiring publication of patent applications eighteen months after their filing
date except under enumerated circumstances). Despite their small statutory footprint, a
robust doctrinal and theoretical edifice has been built on these disclosure and publication
provisions. The disclosure theory of patent law portrays a patent as a "bargain" between an
inventor and the public. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 15o-
51 (1989); Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998). It depicts the patent regime as
a simple quid pro quo: in return for granting the patentee a temporally limited right to
exclude from the claimed embodiments, the public gets the benefit of access to and use of
information about the invention that the patentee could have chosen to keep secret. J.E.M.
Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 142 (quoting Kewanee Oil Col. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
484 (1974)). Importantly, this benefit includes unrestricted access to and use of the
inventive information itself during the term of the patent. Members of the public can
access and copy the information about an invention, profit from the information by
presenting it as an expert for a fee and use the information as a springboard to improve on
and/or design-around the claimed invention-all without the authorization of the patentee.
This access and use in turn allows the patentee's competitors to improve on and/or design
around the claimed invention before the expiration of the patent term. See 1 DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.01 (2007) ("On [publication] the patent immediately
increases the storehouse of public information available for further research and
innovation.").
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grants a limited privilege of access to a person in need for the duration
of the need, regardless of consent of the owner. 45
The unique dualism of the patent regime derives from the fact that
the claims (i.e., the inventor's right to exclude) and the disclosure (i.e.,
the public's privileges of use and access) govern distinct resources.
Claims describe and propertize "embodiments" of inventive
information-things like vials of isolated Protein X or mousetraps that
can catch mice. In contrast, disclosures convey and "publicize"46 the
inventive information qua information, i.e., the information that
demonstrates inter alia the novelty, nonobviousness, and utility of the
embodiments. Even as the claimed embodiments of the inventive
information are placed under the control of the patentee, the
information about the invention is "exacted" from the patentee47 and
made free for all to use in a public domain. Through the disclosure,
information about Protein X's structure and information about how
the mouse trap catches mice is released to the public for use without
condition.48
A structural theory of Section 101 assigns to the patentable subject
matter doctrine the role of protector of one side of the duality, the
public privilege to access and use inventive information, from
encroachment by the other, the private right of the patentee to exclude
others from the claimed invention. An inventor can easily come up
with claim language that describes a resource that is nothing more
than inventive information qua information. For example, as already
discussed, she can claim "a representation of the structure of Protein
X recorded on a tangible medium." Whenever a claim, such as this
one, describes and therefore purports to propertize inventive
information qua information, the claim should be held to recite
unpatentable subject matter. Without a structural theory of Section
101, there is no patent law doctrine that ensures that the patentee
makes the information that she must disclose freely available to the
public, and patentees arguably could claim information qua
45 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 191-211 (1977) (listing privileged
entries to land irrespective of any transaction between the parties).
46 "Publicize" is used here in the sense of granting privileges of both access and use to the
public, not merely in the sense of making the existence of the resource known to the public.
47 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 216.
48 There is, of course, one condition on how the public can use the information: they cannot
use it to make a patentable embodiment that falls within the scope of a valid claim.
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information.49 If they were to succeed, only the residual information
that happened to be left over after the figure of the claim had been
delineated would be freely available, and the public domain of the
disclosure side of the duality would flow from patentees' errors of
under-claiming, not from any substantive obligation placed on the
patentees.
Clearly, there is nothing in the literal text of Section lO when
examined in isolation that suggests that courts should be protecting
the duality of the patent regime and preventing encroachment by
claims into the realm of the disclosure. Entitled "Inventions
Patentable," Section lO merely states that "[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this article title."5o Most attempts to look for an
interpretation of the patentable subject matter doctrine that are
grounded in the statutory text zoom in to a narrow frame, undertake
an exegesis of the four terms "process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter," and query whether there is some type of
subject matter that falls between the cracks of these four categories.1
A structural statutory argument, however, looks at the words of
the statute not in isolation, but in the context of the statutory scheme
as a whole.52 When Section 1oi is viewed in the context of the
disclosure provisions and the claiming/disclosing duality, it is clear
that there is at least one thing that is not a patentable "process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter": the inventive
information qua information that is "exacted" from the patentee by
the disclosure requirements3 and that must, as a consequence, be
made freely available to all.
49 See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text (arguing that claims to inventive
information qua information are arguably novel, nonobvious and statutorily useful and
that the best statutory locus for a rule prohibiting their patentability lies in Section lOl).
50 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2007).
51 See, e.g., In re Nuijten, 50o F.3d at 1351-58.
52 See United Savs. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988) (Scalia, J.) ("Statutory construction ... is a holistic endeavor."); 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing the
principle of "whole statute" interpretation).
s3 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 216.
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From a policy perspective, an interpretation of Section 101 that
encompasses the role of protecting the structural claiming/disclosing
duality reflects the "basic tools" rationale that the Supreme Court has
already articulated as a motivating concern of the subject matter
patentability doctrine.54 Each side of the duality seeks to promote
progress through a different mechanism. The right of patentees to
exclude others from claimed embodiments overcomes the free-rider
problem that makes an unstructured market for inventive information
fail. It augments the incentive to generate inventive information
where it is possible that insufficient incentives otherwise may exist.
In contrast, the disclosure requirement and its public-domain
approach establish a system whereby the inventors of generation N
reduce the costs of innovation of the inventors of generation N+1. The
disclosure makes sure that inventive information-a non-fungible
resource that is commonly used as an input into the inventive process,
i.e., a "basic tool"-is freely available to all future inventors.55 It does
so, however, only if a structural theory of Section 101 protects it from
encroachment by the propertizing effect of the claims. In sum, a
structural theory of Section 101 suggests that inventive information
qua information should be a "spillover" of property in innovation and
an example of why and how an inventor should not internalize the full
social value of her invention.56
IV. EVERYTHING IS INFORMATION?
One difficulty with developing a structural theory of Section 1O
that treats information qua information as unpatentable subject
matter is that the PTO routinely allows (and the courts routinely
sanction) patent claims that describe states of being that we intuitively
understand to be information-bearing states. Claims to isolated and
54 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (outlining the "basic tools" justification of
the prohibition on claims to "laws of nature" in the abstract).
55 A bar on claims to inventive information qua information is also required to ensure that
rights to exclude from information qua information do not create distortions in the
marketplace of ideas that the First Amendment is designed to safeguard. See Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
56 Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 257 (2007)
(explaining the positive role of "spillovers" from patents that are defined by the fact that
"the social value of innovations far exceeds the private value").
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purified DNA57 and computer software recorded on tangible storage
media58 are readily viewed as claims to information. The problem
extends beyond the self-evidently borderline cases as it is possible to
describe all claims in some technological fields as claims to
information.59 If we do not want a structural theory of Section lol to
undermine the entire patent regime, we must be able to distinguish
claims describing unpatentable states of being that convey inventive
information qua information from claims describing patentable
embodiments of that same inventive information. Currently, we have
no such taxonomy of information.
One possible, but ultimately unsuccessful, solution to this problem
is to use immateriality as a proxy for information qua information.60
In In re Nui'ten, the Federal Circuit recently announced that a claim
to an information-carrying "signal" is not patentable subject matter
because it is too intangible to be a "manufacture" under Section 101.61
Following this materiality approach, however, a claim recites a
propertizable embodiment rather than information qua information
so long as it describes a tangible thing that has material existence in
57 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Molecules v. Information: Should Patents Protect Both?, 8
B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 19o, 196 (2002) (panel presentation) ("You know, of course, the
truth is that DNA sequences are both molecules and information. They are informational
molecules, and it is not clear where to put these informational molecules in a taxonomy
that distinguishes tangible embodiments from intangible information.").
58 In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (acquiescing to claims to computer
software drawn to describe software stored on a tangible medium). In re Beauregard
seems to create an acute problem of subject matter patentability under a structural claims
like those in theory of Section lOl because it is possible to infringe a Beauregard claim
merely by sharing information about the invention, i.e. the software code. (I thank Mark
Lemley for this observation.) Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 794-95 (arguing that a claim
to a DNA sequence in computer-readable form would violate the spirit of the traditional
disclosure-for-exclusive-rights bargain of the patent regime). The difficulties that the
informational nature of software creates for the patent regime extend beyond In re
Beauregard claims. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007) (holding
that computer software can be a "component" under Section 271(0, but that it is not
"supplie[d] ... from the United States" when the material instantiation of the code sent
from the United States is copied onto a computer abroad).
59 Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561, 582-88
(20o6) (arguing that all claims to biotechnology inventions are claims to information).
6o Cf supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (addressing recent cases raising
intangibility as a limit on patentable subject matter).
62 See, e.g., In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356-57.
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the world of extension. 62 A materiality approach to Section lOl
therefore proves to be insufficiently protective of the disclosing side of
the claiming/disclosing duality because it allows claims and property
to encroach into the public domain of the disclosure. The public
domain of information qua information is useless if information only
remains free for all to use when in a truly noetic state (if, in fact,
information ever exists in a noetic state-a statement with which a
materialist would clearly disagree). Only inscribed information is
useful information.
Furthermore, in any system that uses information, there will
always be points at which the information is inscribed in a sufficiently
material form so as to be a "manufacture" under In re Nuijten. In fact,
the very paradigm of a claim to information qua information
introduced at the beginning of this article ("a representation of the
structure of Protein X recorded on a tangible medium") is a claim to
information qua information and yet it only describes material things
or "manufacture[s]" under In re Nuijten. Under a structural theory of
Section l1, the material substrate that is necessary to store and
communicate inventive information qua information must be shielded
from privatization in order to create a meaningful public domain. A
bar on claims to intangible subject matter is not sufficient to ensure a
bar on claims to inventive information qua information. 63
Immateriality is neither the same quality as, nor a reasonable proxy
for, the informationality that should be of concern in crafting the
public domain of patent law.64 When Section 101 is viewed from a
structural perspective, In re Nuijten is a red herring that may cause us
to take our eyes off of the prize of a robust public domain of inventive
information qua information.
62 Id. at 1351-52 (noting that the PTO allowed, and the Federal Circuit did not review a
claim to "[a] storage medium having stored thereon a signal with embedded supplemental
data"). It is important to note, however, that the claim at issue in In re Nuijten arguably is
not an impermissible claim to information qua information despite its immateriality. Id.
at 1368 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Any information that [the
claimed signal] conveys is wholly distinct from the invention itself; the [claim to the] signal
is a [claim to an] information carrier, not an attempt to claim information itself.").
63 In addition to being underinclusive with respect to the claims to information qua
information that should be excluded from patentable subject matter under a structural
theory of Section lol, a bar on intangible signals is also arguably overinclusive. See supra
note 62.
64 Cf In re Nuijten, 50o F.3d at 1366 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("As a matter of principle, there is little reason to allow patent claims to otherwise
unpatentable, deemed abstractions just because those deemed abstractions are stored in a
tangible medium .... ").
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V. CONCLUSION
Thus, as promised, this article ends by bringing into focus the
most difficult obstacle that a structural theory of Section 0l1 must
surmount. The important question going forward is not whether there
are blatant claims to inventive information qua information that
courts applying Section ol do and should label as unpatentable
subject matter. Clearly, there are, and a structural theory of Section
lO provides a narratively coherent, policy driven and statutorily
justified basis for courts to make these decisions. Rather, the
important question is: how can we separate the patentable claims to
tangible, information-bearing states of being from the unpatentable
ones?
Information is a broad and, more importantly, polyvalent concept.
If a structural theory of Section lOl is to be of practical use, then we
need a taxonomy of the different ways in which tangible states of
being can be informational or, perhaps, possess informationality.65
We must restrict the scope of the structural theory's claim-denying
impact to the types of claims to information in which the relevant
policy concerns are at their strongest. This suggestion, however, is
obviously more of a point of departure than it is a sign of arrival.
There is much, much more that must be said to develop such a
taxonomy, argue that its categories are administrable, and
demonstrate that it can distinguish those claims that, from a policy
perspective, should be held to recite patentable information from
those claims that should not.66
65 See Burk, supra note 59, at 584 (noting the need for "some rigor to the use of the term
'information' in the 'information patents' argument"). Cf. In re Nujiten, 500 F.3d at 1366-
67 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the need to differentiate
between "patentable inventions involving the manipulation or transmission of information
from unpatentable inventions whose only utility lies in the particular information they
convey" and the difficulty of drawing this line).
66 See Kevin Emerson Collins, Patentable and Unpatentable Information (on file with
author) (mining the philosophy of information for distinctions in the ways in which
tangible states of being are informational and searching for policy-driven proxies to
differentiate patentable and unpatentable claims to information).
2008]

